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I. INTRODUCTION

More than one hundred years ago, on June 20, 1893, John T. Hicks was awarded
U.S. Patent Number 500,071, entitled "Method of and Means for Cash Registering
and Account Checking." The patent described a method of preventing theft
committed by restaurant waiters. Although it was later declared invalid by a court
for lack of "patentability, "1 the Hicks patent was one of the earliest examples of a
business method patent - that is, a patent that protects a method of doing business.
Many such patents were issued over the ensuing decades. Nevertheless, the
public and the patent bar were somewhat surprised when in 1998 the Federal Circuit
declared that business methods could be patented. That court's decision in State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc. 2 seemed to usher in a
new era of patenting methods of conducting commercial transactions, such as those
conducted over the Internet.
Its 1999 decision in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.3 broadened the contours of State Street Bank, apparently
doing away with the requirement that a method claim must involve any sort of
physical transformation in order to render it patentable and focusing instead on the
4
"useful, concrete and tangible result" aspect of the test.
Consider the subject matter of recently-issued U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919 (issued
Dec. 11, 2001), entitled "System and Method For Providing Reservations for
Restroom Use." This patent, owned by IBM, contains the following claim:
1. A method of providing reservations for restroom use, comprising:
receiving a reservation request from a user; and
5
notifying the user when the restroom is available for his or her use.
Following a PTO-ordered reexamination of this patent prompted in part by

7
public derision, 6 IBM recently disclaimed this patent.
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I Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). Although cited by the
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2 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
4 Id. at 1358-59.
5 U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919 (issued Dec. 11, 2001).
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Assuming that the IBM patent can be considered a business method - the
specification describes the method as being useful for reserving restrooms aboard
commercial airplanes - one may wonder whether patents of this sort protect the
"useful arts" contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and whether such a
patent would meet the State Street Bank/A T&Ttest for patentability.
The outer boundaries of the State Street Bank holding are unclear. Although
the Federal Circuit did not declare that all business methods were necessarily
patentable, the court stated that "the transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application ... because it produces a useful,
concrete and tangible result - a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and
reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and
in subsequent trades."8 This, the court said, was all that was needed to pass muster
under section 101 of the patent statute. 9
The "useful, concrete and tangible result" standard announced in State Street
Bank renders it difficult to determine whether a particular patent claim recites
statutory subject matter. The requirement that the claimed subject matter be
"useful" imposes few hurdles to patentability, except perhaps in cases of inoperable
devices such as perpetual-motion machines and truly meritless inventions, such as a
method of clogging a sink. The requirements of "concreteness" and "tangibility"
likewise serve as relatively poor indicia of patentability. The dictionary definitions of
"concrete" and "tangible" are very similar, providing few clues as to what might fall
on one side of the line or the other. 10
Applying the State Street Bank/A T&Tformulation to a given set of facts can
be tricky. Consider, for example, a method of interviewing a job candidate that
allows the interview to be conducted more efficiently. The claimed steps of this
hypothetical method, which is assumed to be novel and not obvious, are set forth
below:
1. A method of interviewing a job candidate, comprising the steps of:
(1) obtaining from the job candidate only basic biographical information
(name, address, telephone number, and social security number);
(2) comparing the basic biographical information to a database of citizen
information maintained by a governmental entity;
(3) if the comparison yields no match, terminating the interview; and

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2002/weekl4/patrequ.htm(last visited October 10, 2002)
(showing Commissioner-order reexamination C.N. 90/006,176, ordered February 12, 2002).
7 Disclaimer, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, April 2, 2002, available at

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2002/weekl4/patdisc.htm (last visited October 10, 2002).
8 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
9 The court also concluded that the claimed invention did not constitute a mathematical
algorithm, thus avoiding another bar to patentability.
10The American Heritage Dictionary (1981 ed.) defines the word "concrete" as "relating to an
actual, specific thing or instance; not general; particular ... existing in reality or in real experience;
perceptible by the senses; real." The same dictionary defines the word "tangible" as "discernable by
the touch; capable of being touched; palpable . . . visible and appraisable; corporeal." Id. It is
unclear how a share price (i.e., a number) is "palpable."
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(4) If the comparison yields a match, conducting a full interview with the
job candidate.
Suppose that the specification of this hypothetical patent discloses a scientific
study demonstrating that approximately 10% of job applicants use fraudulent
biographical information (e.g., a bogus social security number) and that conducting
extensive interviews for such applicants wastes valuable time of the employer.
Consequently, the inventors propose a scheme by which basic biographical
information is elicited and verified before continuing with a full interview, as
outlined in the hypothetical claim above. Based on actual test results conducted
across many different employers, the specification asserts that the invention
produces a 25% reduction in labor costs associated with interviewing candidates who
otherwise would be terminated or rejected later in the process. This increase in
efficiency is well documented and produces a "practical" effect, 1e., an increase in
efficiency of the corporation.
Should this method be patentable merely because it produces a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result?" Does this method meet the definition of a "process"
that falls within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101? Given that no physical transformation
is necessary to meet the statutory requirement for utility, and given that the claimed
invention produces useful and arguably "concrete" results, the claim would seem to
be patentable.
Although the Federal Circuit has yet to strike down a business method
patent for failing to meet the criteria set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, there are
thousands of patents that may test the limits of the State Street Bank/AT&T
doctrine if ever presented to the court. Consider, for example, the claims of the
following issued U.S. patents:
U.S. Patent No. 6,347,942 (issued Feb. 19, 2002) entitled "Early
Involvement Method for Preparing Elementary School Students for
Secondary School". The only independent claim of this patent appears to
cover a method of preparing students for high school by enrolling them in
an early involvement program and granting school credits to those who
successfully complete the program.
U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued Dec. 22, 1998) entitled "Building Block
Training Systems and Training Methods". The only independent claim of
this patent appears to cover a method of teaching a janitor how to clean a
building by providing him with specially prepared training materials.
U.S. Patent No. 6,257,248 (issued July 10, 2001) entitled "Both Hand
Hair Cutting Method". The only independent claim of this patent appears
to cover a method of cutting hair using both hands. The specification
explains that the invention is intended for use by hairdressers.
U.S. Patent No. 6,049,811 (issued April 11, 2000) entitled "Machine for
Drafting a Patent Application and Process for Doing Same". Independent
claim 10 of this patent appears to cover a method of drafting a patent
application by preparing various sections of the application in a particular
order.
U.S. Patent No. 6,449,600 (issued Sep. 10, 2002) entitled "System,
Method and Computer Program Product for Airport Equipment Information
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and Exchange". Claim 1 of this patent appears to cover a method for
sharing equipment at an airport.
U.S. Patent No. 5,930,769 (issued July 27, 1999) entitled "System and
Method for Fashion Shopping". Claim 1 of this patent appears to cover a
method for shopping for garments based on body type.
Aside from lack of novelty or obviousness, are there no limits on the type of
patents that can be validly granted? What about a method of thinking, or a method
of running a new football formation? Or what about patenting an argument? A
former PTO Director was quoted during an interview as saying that as long as an
argument was novel and non-obvious, he would "not have a problem with [patenting]
it at all."11
This article proposes that the proper inquiry for determining whether a
method claim meets the definition of a "process" under section 101 of the patent
statute is to ask whether (1) the method as disclosed in the patent has a practical
utility; and (2) the method steps as claimed recite some transformation of matter.
Without satisfying both of those independent conditions, the claim would not be
statutory. Nevertheless, under a liberal reading of "transformation," any method
having a practical utility and reciting steps executed in a computer would meet this
definition because executing instructions in the computer changes the state of the
computer. Even a claim to a series of pure mathematical steps - such as the wellknown relation e=mc 2 - if recited as steps executed in a computer, would constitute
patentable subject matter, assuming there is a disclosed utility for the algorithm
(e.g., modeling nuclear bombs). Claims to methods involving such activities as
teaching or sports, however, would fail this test because they lack any transformation
of matter, even though they may have practical utility.
This two-part test is derived from three different sources: (i) the phrase
"useful arts" in the U.S. Constitution; (2) the word "process" in the U.S. patent
statute; and (3) Supreme Court precedent. The two-part test also renders explicit
what was arguably implicit in the State Street Bank opinion - a first requirement
that the claimed invention have a practical utility, expressed as a "useful, concrete
and tangible result," and a second requirement that the claimed invention recite a
transformation of physical subject matter. This test also dispenses with the need for
the so-called "mathematical algorithm exception" and the "mental steps" doctrine,
since any claim that fails to recite a transformation of matter will by definition fail
both of the latter exceptions to patentability.
The proposed test is narrower than the test set forth by the Federal Circuit in
AT&T Corp., but the outcome of that case would nevertheless be the same under this
proposed test because the claim at issue in AT&T Corp. recited sufficient computerimplemented transformation to meet the transformation requirement. Statements in
AT&T Corp. to the effect that no transformation of matter is required can be read to
conflict with earlier Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases.
This article also proposes that, for apparatus claims, the proper inquiry
under section 101 of the statute is to ask whether the claimed apparatus has a
disclosed practical utility and recites structure. No separate transformation of
11Interview between Stephen Pizzo and Q. Todd Diekson, THE O'REILLY NETWORK, May 24,
2000, at http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/222 (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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matter is required for an apparatus claim. Under this test, a machine programmed
with a mathematical algorithm or business method would automatically qualify as
statutory subject matter, even though the algorithm or business method by itself
might not be statutory. This flows naturally from the Federal Circuit's holding in In
re Alappat 12, but it dispenses with the confusing vestiges of case law suggesting that
further inquiry is required to determine whether some other nonstatutory subject
matter was implicitly being claimed. Under the proposed approach, the form in
which the claim is cast - i.e., method or apparatus - determines whether a physical
transformation must be recited in the claim.

II. WHAT IS A "BUSINESS METHOD?"
Given that the Federal Circuit has declared that there is no business method
exception to patentability,1 3 one might wonder whether there remains any useful
purpose in classifying an invention as a "business method." There are several
reasons that this classification retains validity, although the label defies easy
definition.
First, Congress in 1999 enacted a new "prior user rights" defense to patent
infringement that is available only for inventions that are considered to be a "method
of doing or conducting business."1 4 Congressional failure to define what qualifies as a
15
business method will undoubtedly lead to litigation for years to come.
Second, the patent office gives special scrutiny to patent applications that are
16
classified into Class 705 - its proxy for computer-implemented business methods.
The PTO's reason for treating these applications with special regard stems in part
from public outcry over Internet-related patents that purportedly covered obvious
variations of known technology. The allowance rate for patent applications falling in
Class 705 has been substantially lower than that for patent applications in other
17
classes.
Third, Europe and certain other countries take a dim view of business
method inventions and may reject patent applications covering such inventions, and

33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc).
State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
14 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
15 As of the date of this paper, no court decisions applying this new defense have been reported.
16 See Business Methods White Paper UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). The PTO announced a new
quality initiative for patents in Class 705, explaining that "[a] new second-level review of all allowed
applications in Class 705 is required to ensure compliance with the mandatory search requirements,
clarity and completeness of reasons for allowance, and to determine whether the scope of the claims
12

13

should be reconsidered." Id.; see also,John Love, Day 6: Business Perspectiveson Patents:Software
and
the
Internet:
Diverse
Perspectives
on
Patents,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227johnlove.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (briefing by John J.
Love, Group Director Technology Center 2100).
17 See Love, supra at note 16, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227johnlove.pdf.
(citing
allowance rate of 45% for Class 705 applications versus 69% for other classes during fiscal year

2001).
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may refuse to examine them.18 This means that U.S. inventors may be limited to
obtaining only a U.S. patent, making it difficult to pursue infringers in foreign
countries.
Fourth, legislation introduced in Congress in 2001 proposes to severely
curtail the scope and enforceability of patents that are considered "business
methods." 19

Fifth, companies that obtain business method patents may be subjected to
20
bad publicity.
Although not predicated on being classified as "business methods," methods
of performing surgery have also been singled out for special treatment. Congress in
21
1996 amended the patent statute to preclude enforcement of such patents.
As set forth above, the PTO gives extra scrutiny to computer-implemented
business methods. Yet the PTO's treatment of computer-implemented business
practices has arguably not been entirely uniform. Inventions that seemingly belong
in the same class 705 category - and that would otherwise be subject to the extra
level of scrutiny in that class - are sometimes treated differently. For example, U.S.
Patent No. 5,909,668 (issued June 1, 1999), entitled "Banquet Hall Reservation
Management System," describes and claims a computer-implemented system that
allows banquet halls to be reserved in an orderly manner. The patent, which is
classified in class 705, was issued in 1999. Yet U.S. Patent No. 5,978,463 (issued
Nov. 2, 1999), entitled "Reservation Scheduling System for Audio Conferencing
Resources" was issued the same year but was not classified in class 705. It is not
clear why reserving banquet halls is considered a business method but reserving
audio resources is not.
Similarly, U.S. Patent No. 5,842,180 (issued Nov. 24, 1998), entitled "Method
and System for Detecting and Correcting Errors in a Spreadsheet Formula," was
classified in class 705 and presumably was subjected to extra scrutiny by the PTO.
Yet U.S. Patent No. 6,138,130 (issued Oct. 24, 2000), entitled "System and Method
for Processing Data in an Electronic Spreadsheet in Accordance With a Data Type,"
was not classified in class 705. Again, it is unclear why one method of manipulating

18 European Patent Convention Article 52(2)(C), excludes schemes, rules, and methods for
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers. The
Canadian patent office similarly proscribes patents on methods of doing business, methods of
accounting or statistics, personality or IQ tests and the like. Examples of Non-Statutory Subject
Matter, Section 16.04, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/ch16e.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
19 The "Business Method Improvement Act of 2001" proposes a sweeping definition of business
method that would apparently cover such devices as cash registers, enterprise management
software, and computers that run the New York Stock Exchange. H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001).
The Act would force publication of business method patent applications; create new opposition
procedures for such patents; lower the burden of proof for invalidating such patents; and render
such patents "presumed obvious" in certain cases. Id.
20 One example includes Amazon.com, which has received widespread criticism for its so-called
'oneclick" patent. See Jesse Berst, How PatentAttorneys Are Stealing Our Future, ZDNET, (Jan.
18, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/story/story-index 20000118.html (last visited Oct.
10, 2002). For a collection of bad press concerning business method patents, see generally Gregory
Aharonian, Critiques,at http://www.bustpatents.com/software.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
21 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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data in a spreadsheet is considered to be a "business practice" but another method is
not.
Finally, U.S. Patent No. 6,098,053 (issued Aug. 1, 2000), entitled "System
and Method for Performing an Electronic Financial Transaction," was classified in
class 705. Yet U.S. Patent No. 6,097,834 (issued Aug. 1, 2000), entitled "Financial
Transaction Processing Systems and Methods," was issued on the same day and was
not classified in class 705. There are numerous other examples of seemingly similar
computer-implemented inventions that were subjected to different treatment by the
PTO.
The above examples are not intended as a criticism of the PTO. They merely
reinforce the point that it is difficult to decide what falls on one side of the line as
opposed to the other. Obviously, line-drawing creates hard cases. It isnot known
whether a court would attach any significance to the PTO's classification of a patent
when determining whether a patent was subject to the defense under 35 U.S.C. §
273, which applies only to business method patents.
Congressional attempts at defining business method inventions are similarly
problematic. For example, the "Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2001,"22
proposes to amend title 35 to define the terms business method and "business method
invention" as follows:
(f) The term business method means (i)a method(A) of(i) processing data; or
(ii) performing calculation operations; and
(B) which is uniquely designed for or utilized in the practice,
administration, or management of an enterprise;
(2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and
(3) any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in
paragraph (1)or a technique described in paragraph (2).
(g) The term "business method invention" means(i) any invention which is a business method (including any software or
other apparatus); and
(2) any invention which is comprised of any claim that is a business
23
method.
Examples of inventions that would apparently fit the bill include cash
registers and bar code scanners; instant replay camera systems at sports events;
accounting software and other management tools (e.g., computerized timekeeping
software); and all software that runs the New York Stock exchange. Note that the
proposed statute expressly equates business "apparatus" with business "methods."
The proposed bill would require that business method inventions be
published at 18 months; institute special opposition procedures for business method
inventions; lower the burden of proof for invalidating business method patents; make
22 H.R.
23 H.R.

1332, 107th Cong.
1332, 107th Cong. § 2.
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it easier to prove that a business method invention was obvious; and force patent
applicants to disclose whether they performed a prior art search if the invention was
24
classified as a business method.
Aside from certain practical effects of having a patent characterized as a
business method as described above, there is apparently no longer any legal reason
for treating such patents differently for purposes of evaluating whether claims
appearing in such patents are valid. Nevertheless, as discussed below, patents
directed to business-related inventions may run into other patent law doctrines that
limit the scope of patentability.

III. THE NAME OF THE GAME IS THE CLAIM
The patent statute extends protection to four different categories of
potentially patentable subject matter, including "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."25 Evaluating a given claim to
determine whether it recites statutory subject matter is tricky enough without
blurring the distinctions among these different categories.
As explained by the late Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit, "the name of
the game is the claim." In re Hiniker Co., 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Clevenger, J., quoting prior comments by Judge Rich). Some court decisions,
including the State Street Bank decision, appear to gloss over the form in which a
claim is cast when determining whether the claim recites statutory subject matter.
In other words, even if a claim recites an apparatus, the court will look behind the
drafting of the claim to determine whether the subject matter is an unpatentable
algorithm or other nonstatutory invention. 26 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
condemned a literal reading of patent claims as depending too much on a draftsman's
27
art rather than looking at the policy behind patent laws.
The State Street Bank decision exemplifies this mode of analysis. The court
stated that, "[tihe question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed
to . . . but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular,
its practical utility."28
Footnote 13 of the decision further states that, "[a]ny
historical distinctions between a method of 'doing' business and the means of
carrying it out blur in the complexity of modern business systems."29 The AT&Tcourt
similarly stated that, "we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same regardless of the
form - machine or process - in which a particular claim is drafted."30 Earlier Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) cases had similarly ignored differences
between process claims and apparatus claims for the purposes of evaluating
24 H.R.

1332, 107th Cong.

25 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
26 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 (acknowledging precedent stating that claims could be rejected as
nonstatutory "mathematical algorithm" even if drafted as an apparatus); see also, In -reFreeman,
573 F.2d 1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
27 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
28 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
29 Id. at 1376 n.13.
3o

AT&Tcorp., 172 F.3d at 1357.
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compliance with section 101.31 Legislation introduced in Congress to restrict and
weaken business method patents similarly equates business "apparatus" with
32
business "methods."
Although the only claim at issue in State Street Bank was an apparatus
claim, the Federal Circuit nevertheless ruled on the merits of the so-called business
method exception to patentability and the mathematical algorithm exception to
patentability. The claim recited a data processing system comprising various means
plus function clauses, each of which corresponded to a part of a computer that was
programmed to carry out the function of managing a portfolio.33 The district court
had found that the claim was invalid both because it recited an unpatentable
34
mathematical algorithm, and because it recited an unpatentable business method.
Having concluded that the district court had improperly interpreted the claim
to be a process rather than a machine, 35 the Federal Circuit seemingly could have
based its holding on the fact that neither the business method exception nor the
mathematical algorithm exception was applicable to a claim to a machine. This
would have been consistent with its earlier decision in In re Alappat,36 which held
that a machine programmed with a specific algorithm was patentable. Instead, the
court proceeded to take on the business method exception directly, rejecting it as "illconceived"3 7 and appearing to require only that a claim produce a "useful, concrete,
38
and tangible result."
The proposition that process claims and apparatus claims, even in the
computer arts, should not be considered interchangeably for purposes of determining
whether they recite statutory subject matter, can be demonstrated by a simple
example. Consider the following two claims directed to an invention that allows two
numbers to be added and the resulting sum displayed. Suppose that the patent
specification describes a specialized device that includes summing circuits, an input
keypad, and an electronic display for showing the result.
1.
A method of adding two
numbers, comprising the steps of:
(1) receiving first and second
numbers;
(2) adding the first and second
numbers to produce a sum; and
(3) displaying the sum.

2. An apparatus for adding two numbers,
comprising:
(1) means for receiving first and second
numbers;
(2) means for adding the first and second
numbers to produce a sum; and
(3) means for displaying the sum.

Claim 1 recites a mathematical algorithm that is clearly nonstatutory under
even the most liberal reading of Supreme Court precedent. Claim 2, on the other
'31See, e.g., In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 n.6
(C.C.P.A. 1982). This analysis was criticized, however, in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
32 See supra text accompanying note 19.

3 State St.Bank,
34Id. at 1372.
3 Id.at 1371.
3

149 F.3d at 1371.

6Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41.
7State St.Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.

3

38 Id.
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hand, recites a statutory machine that, while closely paralleling the first claim, is
clearly patentable under the principles of Alappat and other court decisions.
This illustrates one weakness in glossing over the statutory invention
category to which the claim belongs. As is argued in more detail below, a process
should recite a physical transformation in order to satisfy the statutory requirements
for patentability, whereas an apparatus or machine need not recite such a
transformation. It is therefore critical to consider the form in which a claim is cast in
order to determine whether it satisfies the statutory requirements for patentability.
Ignoring the form in which the claim is cast becomes even more problematic
when following the Federal Circuit's admonition in AT&T Corp. that patentability
turns on whether there is a "practical application" for the claimed subject matter.
For example, Einstein's famous equation e=mc 2 has numerous practical applications
in fields such as atomic bombmaking and nuclear reactors. But the equation itself
cannot be patented despite the existence of many practical applications. The critical
difference is in how the invention is claimed.
One way of potentially resolving this problem is to require that the practical
application be recited in the claim (for example, a method of creating an atomic bomb
of a given energy force by calculating the amount of energy from the equation e=mc2).
But this creates its own problems, including violating precedent rejecting so-called
"field of use" restrictions on mathematical algorithms. A nonstatutory mathematical
algorithm claim cannot become statutory merely by reciting the intended application
of the algorithm. 39 Such claims might also be rejected for indefiniteness under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. If the claim is not specific enough regarding how the
practical application is achieved, it could be rejected on that basis. Nevertheless, the
PTO takes the position that a particular utility need not be recited in the claim.
A better solution to this problem, as outlined below, is to require that a process
claim recite some sort of physical transformation as part of the process. Requiring
recitation of the transformation process ensures that the claimed invention will not
recite an abstract idea, since by definition something that exists in tangible form even at the microscopic level - cannot be an abstract idea.
The physical
transformation requirement thus distinguishes abstract ideas, principles, and laws of
nature from patentable subject matter. The separate requirement for practical
utility ensures that the claimed invention satisfies the "useful arts" aspect intended
by the framers of the Constitution.

IV. LIMITS ON BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
Are there any limits on so-called business method patents? Although the
courts will not attach any legal significance to whether a particular claim recites a
business-related method, some patent law doctrines could preclude the patentability
of claims relating to business method inventions. The following sets forth some of
these doctrines.

39 Flook, 437 U.S. at 586, 589-90. The claimed method was specifically limited to a process
comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. Id. at 586.
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A. The "UsefulArts"Limitation
The Constitution authorizes Congress to protect inventions and discoveries in
the "useful arts."40 The Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress may not
exceed the scope of this grant of authority. 4 1 The term "useful arts" has been
interpreted to be identical in scope to "technological arts," thus shifting the definition
problem from one term to another. 42 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has
stated that, "All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts
so as to be in43consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
'useful arts."' So, what are "useful arts" or "technological arts?"
The definitional problems arising from restricting patents to the "technological
arts" are bewildering. 44 Surely Congress did not intend to lock into the Constitution
only those "useful arts" that existed at the time the document was drafted. Science,
after all, is constantly changing, with new sciences having been developed over the
centuries. Consequently, the definition of "useful arts" must adapt with time so as to
encompass new technologies as they are developed.
Yet not all "arts" constitute "useful arts." For example, literature, history,
and other fields of endeavor certainly can be considered "arts," but they are surely
45
not the "useful arts" in the sense contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.
Does this mean that patents should only be granted for inventions that clearly fall
within the purview of science or engineering? What about medicine? What about
economics, particularly applied economics, which relies on scientific theories and
principles? If an artist develops a new painting technique, is that a "useful art" as
opposed to a "fine art?" What if the artist is able to increase his or her efficiency in
creating paintings by using a new and non-obvious assembly line of painting stations,
each of which operates on a predefined portion of the canvas? Would such a
technique render it patentable, changing it from a "fine art" to a "useful art?"
Curiously, it appears that no court has ever invalidated a patent claim on the
basis that it did not fall within the "technological arts."46 Although the PTO's
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that claims can be rejected under
section 101 of the statute if they are "devoid of any limitation to a practical
application in the technological arts,"47 many patents have issued in such "non40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
41 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
42 In ro Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
4 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997,
1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., concurring) (equating "technological arts" with "useful arts.").
44 Soo Alan L. Durham, Useful Arts in the Information Ago, BYU L. REV. 1419 (1999), for an
exhaustive treatment of possible meanings of the term "useful arts" and a proposal for applying the
term broadly.
4, Soo Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that the
constitutionally derived exclusive right was for "technological innovation").
46 An unpublished opinion of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ruled that a
method of evaluating an intangible asset by performing various steps of establishing variables,
scoring performance criteria statements, and physically plotting a point on a chart failed to recite
statutory subject matter because it did not fall in the "technological arts." Ex Parte Bowman, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d 1669 (Bd. Pat. App. Intf. 2001) (unpublished).
47 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 II.A. (Aug. 2001 ed.).
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technological" areas as hair cutting, athletics, and teaching. 48 Consequently, it is
unclear how rigorously the PTO enforces this restriction, and what definition it
applies in determining what qualifies as "technological."
In its seminal decision in Diamond v. Diehr' 9, the Supreme Court referred
approvingly to the claimed process for curing rubber as like other "industrial
processes . . . which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws."50 Yet that decision did not seem to turn on evidence of industrial
applicability. 51 And unlike Europe, which imposes an "industrial applicability"
requirement on patents, 52 the United States has no such statutory limitation, unless
the court-imposed "technological" limitation is the same as Europe's "industrial"
53
requirement.
A modern dictionary defines the word "industrial" as "of or relating to
industry." 54 The same dictionary defines "industry" as "systematic labor especially
for some useful purpose or the creation of something of value . . . a department or
branch of a craft, art, business, or manufacture, especially one that employs a large
personnel and capital especially in manufacturing." 55 The same dictionary defines
"technology" as "the practical application of knowledge, especially in a given area,"
and "technical" as "having special and usually practical knowledge especially of a
56
mechanical or scientific subject."
These definitions are seemingly unhelpful in segregating inventions relating to
useful or technological arts from those relating to other arts. Yet the definitions are
loosely consistent with one common theme that distinguishes most technological arts
from the liberal arts: that of transforming physical things. The practice of law, a
method of memorizing names, the study of history, and the playing of a musical
instrument all lack any transformation of physical materials or objects. On the other
hand, mixing chemicals, operating a computer, and cutting a piece of metal all
involve transforming physical things, even if only at the microscopic level.
The distinction is not perfect. For example, the act of painting a picture surely
transforms a blank canvas into a painted canvas and yet that does not make it a
"useful art" in the Constitutional sense. But a new type of paintbrush for use by an
artist would unquestionably be patentable. Similarly, treating a patient for a
medical condition by giving the patient a new drug would seem to present a close
48

See Section I, supra.

450 U.S. 175 (1981).
50 Id. at 184.
49

51 Jd
52

The European Patent Convention Article 52, extends patent protection to "any inventions

which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step."
The article specifically excludes, among other things, schemes, rules and methods for performing
mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers. Id. The European
Patent Convention Article 57 further defines "industrial application" as follows: " [a]n invention shall
be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of
industry, including agriculture."
5
In this regard, note Judge Baldwin's concurring opinion in Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 895
(Baldwin, J., concurring) ("Is this term [technological arts] intended to be synonymous with the
'industrial technology'- mentioned by Judge Smith?").
54 Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997).
55

Jd
C
Id.
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case. Although the act of giving the medicine itself does not "transform" anything,
once the medicine enters the body of the patient it "transforms" the patient's body in
some manner.
The Constitutional limits imposed by the term "useful arts" are unclear and will
require further clarification by the courts in future cases. Nevertheless, focusing on
whether a claim recites a transformation of physical matter can serve as a rough
proxy for dividing the traditional "liberal" arts from the traditional "industrial" arts.
The use of this proxy in a proposed test for patenting process claims is discussed in
more detail herein.

B. The StatutoryRequirement of a 'Proeess"
One way of determining whether a given method claim recites statutory
subject matter is to focus on the meaning of the word "process." Section 101 of the
patent statute extends patent protection to a "process," and section 100(b) of the
statute defines a process somewhat circularly as "process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
57
or material."
In an 1877 case, Coebrane v. Deene 8s , the Supreme Court defined a process as:
a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result .... It is
an act or a series of acts performed on the subject-matter to be transformed
59
and reduced to a different state or thing.
The claimed invention in that case, which the Court found to be patentable,
recited a process for manufacturing flour in order to improve its quality.6 0 The
process included steps of taking out superfine flour; taking out impurities by
screening and blowing; and regrinding and rebolting the purified middlings.6 1 The
Court concluded that there was no need for the claims to be limited to any particular
machinery, and provided the above-quoted definition of a process in support of its
conclusion that the process was patentable. 62 Thus, one reading of the decision is
that a process is patentable if it involves a series of acts performed on materials that
causes the materials to be transformed into a different state or thing.
The Supreme Court again considered the patentability of processes in Tighman
v. Proeto#r3. In that case, the patent related to a process of separating fats and oils
into various other substances. 64 The claim recited a process of "the manufacturing of
fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature
and pressure." 65 The Court noted that during the process a chemical change took
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
94 U.S. 780 (1877).
5 Coehrane,94 U.S. at 787-88.
57
58

60 Id. at 781.

61Id. at 785-86.
132 Id.
at 788.
(33 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
(4 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 708.
1 Id. at 709.
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place in the fat due to the heat and pressure, a process that Tilghman had
discovered. 66 The Court acknowledged that Tilghman had used different types of
machines to carry out the process, 67 and thus his patent was not limited to any
particular apparatus. 68 The Court also quoted approvingly from an 1853 Supreme
Court decision, including the following passage that seems to define the word
"process:"
The term 'machine' includes every mechanical device or combination on
mechanical powers and devices to perform some function or to produce a
certain effect or result. But where the result or effect is produced by
chemical action, by the operation or application of some element or power of
nature, or of one substance to another, such modes, methods, or operations
69
are called processes.
The Tilghman Court distinguished the claimed process from a "mere principle"
as follows. The principle was characterized as the scientific fact that the elements of
neutral fat must be united with an atomic equivalent of water in order to be
separated from each other and become free.70 The patented process, on the other
hand, was the method of separating the elements by subjecting the fat with water to
a high degree of heat.7 1 The Court concluded that the latter steps qualified as "most
72
certainly a process.
One reading of Tiighman is that if a process claim recites a chemical action;
the application of some element or power of nature; or an interaction between
substances, the claim will meet the requirement of a "process" and will be considered
statutory subject matter.
Note that Tilghman's claim involved both chemical
reactions and application of a "power of nature" (i.e., heating).
In its 1969 decision in In re Prater 3, the CCPA characterized the Supreme
Court's definition of a process in Coebrane as dictum, concluding that there was no
requirement that a process must operate physically upon substances in order to be
patentable.7 4 According to the CCPA, the Coebrane decision stood merely for the
proposition that a process is not limited to the means used in performing it.7 5 This
76
seems to be a strained reading of Coehrane. An earlier version of the Prater
decision, which was later superseded, contained an even more limiting analysis of
Coebrane and Tilghman, and proposed a sweeping definition for a statutory process
that essentially equated patentability with "industrial technology" and "useful arts"77
i.e., to the limits of the Constitution.
66 Id. at 713.
67 Id. at 714.
68 Id. at 713-14.
69 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 722.
70 Id. at 712-23.
71

Jd. at 729.

2 Id.

73 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
74 Prater,415 F.2d at 1403.
75 Id.

76 In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (1969), superseded following rehearing, In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
77 Id. at 1389.
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The Supreme Court in 1909 clarified that a patent could be granted for a
8
process involving mechanical steps such as cutting and bending sheet metal.7
79
Many decades later, the Supreme Court's trilogy of Gottsehalk v. Benson,
Parker v. Flook,80 and Diamond v. Diehirf attempted to clarify what constituted a
statutory process.
In Benson, the claimed invention recited a method of converting signals from
binary coded decimal form into binary form, including steps of storing, shifting, and
adding various signals in registers.8 2 The Court held that the claimed invention was
nothing more than an abstract process that was so "sweeping as to cover both known
and unknown uses" of the conversion process.8 3 Quoting approvingly from its earlier
Coehrane decision, the Court stated, "[tiransformation and reduction of an article 'to
a different state or thing' isthe clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
84
not include particular machines."
But in a confusing passage, the Court appeared to reject the argument that a
process claim must either be tied to a particular machine or must operate to change
articles or materials to a different state or thing.8 5 The claim at issue was rejected on
the different ground that it was an attempt to "wholly pre-empt the mathematical
8 6
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."
Consequently, the best reading of Benson is that a claim to a mathematical formula
that effectively preempts the formula is unpatentable. No further elaboration to the
definition of process, aside from this negative limitation, can be gleaned from the
decision. The language rejecting a requirement that a process claim must operate to
change articles or materials appears to be dictum, given that the Court did not
discuss that point in any detail and invalidated the claim on a different ground.
A few years later, in Flook,87 the Court struck down another process claim.
The invention involved a method of updating alarm limits for use in a catalytic
conversion process. 8 8 The primary novelty was in the mathematical formula used to
calculate the new alarm limit; the claim recited steps of determining the value of a
process variable; determining a new alarm base using particular equation;
89
determining an updated alarm limit; and adjusting the alarm limit.
The Supreme Court concluded that the claim was not a "process" within the
meaning of the patent statute because the novelty resided in a mathematical
algorithm, which the Court treated as part of the unpatentable prior art for the
purposes of analyzing the claim. 90 Once the algorithmic part was ignored as
unpatentable, the rest of the claim merely recited a conventional process, which could

Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 385-86 (1909).
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
80437 U.S. 584 (1978).
81 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
82 Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
83 Id. at 68.
81 Id.at 69-70.
78

7)

85 Id.at 71.

Id.at 71-72.
U.S. 584.
88 Fook, 437 U.S. at 585.
86

87 437

89 Id. at 596.
90 Id.at 595.
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not be patented. 9 1 At the end of its opinion, the Court stated, "[viery simply, our
holding today is that a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied
to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101."92 In another
footnote, the Court stated that:
An argument can be made, however, that this Court has only recognized a
process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a
particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different state or
thing.' See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-788, 24 L.Ed. 1390. As in
Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not
meet one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents. 409 U.S., at 71,
93
93 S.Ct., at 257.
Only three years later, in Diehr,94 the Supreme Court eliminated the
requirement that the mathematical algorithm be deemed part of the prior art for the
purposes of analyzing the statutory viability of a claim under section 101 of the
patent. 95 The Court held that the claimed method of operating a rubber-molding
press by using a mathematical equation to determine when the press should be
opened met the requirements of a "process" as that term was used in the statute and
the case law.
After quoting with approval the "transformation" language in Cochrane, the
Court stated that, "we think that a physical and chemical process for molding
precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter. That respondents' claims involve the transformation of an
article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing
cannot be disputed." 96 The Court also stated that, "industrial processes such as this
are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws."97 In contrast to Benson and Flook, the Supreme Court actually applied
the process definition announced in Cocbrane and, finding that the definition was
satisfied, upheld the patentability of the claim.
The Federal Circuit confronted the outer limits of a statutory process in its
1994 In re Schradef 8 decision. In that case, the court held that a method of
competitively bidding on items, including various steps of identifying related items in
a record; offering the items to potential bidders; receiving bids; indexing the bids, and
identifying bids corresponding to a prevailing total price, failed to recite a statutory
process under section 101 of the statute. 99 According to the Federal Circuit, "[wihen
Congress approved the addition of the term "process" to the categories of patentable
subject matter in 1952, it incorporated the definition of "process" that had evolved in

91 Id. at 594.

Id. at 595 n.18.
Fook, 437 U.S. at 589 n.9.
94 450 U.S. 175.
95 Diehz, 450 U.S. at 188-89.
96 Id. at 184.
92
93

97 Id.
98

In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

99 Id.
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the courts. 100 As of 1952, that term included a requirement that there be a
"transformation or reduction of subject matter."101 In addition to citing Diehr, the
court also quoted its earlier decision in Arrythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp.1 02 for the proposition that transformation of subject matter
"representative of or constituting" physical activity or objects, such as human cardiac
activity or X-ray attenuation data representative of CAT scan images, could supply
the necessary transformation. 10 3 But the court concluded that there was nothing
10 4
physical at all about the claim, and rejected it as nonstatutory.
Then, in 1999, the Federal Circuit appeared to change its mind. In AT&T
Corp.,10 5 the court concluded that no physical transformation was necessary after all.
The claimed invention in AT&T Corp. provided a method of indicating a
10 6
telephone call recipient's primary interexchange carrier (PIC) in a message record.
The invention was designed to operate in a telecommunication system having
multiple long-distance service providers.
The system contains local exchange
carriers (LECs) and long-distance service carriers (IXCs).107 Each customer has a
local exchange carrier that provides access to the long-distance service carriers; the
customer selects a long-distance carrier, such as AT&T, to be its primary longdistance service carrier or PIC.108
Some long-distance service carriers, like Excel, contract to route their
subscribers' calls through various switches and transmission lines. 10 9 The system
relies on a three-step process when a caller makes a long-distance call. First, the call
is transmitted to the LEC, which identifies the caller's PIC and automatically routes
the call to the facilities used by the caller's PlC.110 Second, the PIC's facilities carry
the call to the LEC that serves the person being called.11 1 Finally, the call recipient's
LEC delivers the call over its local network to the recipient's telephone.11 2 A switch
in the network monitors and records information relating to the call for billing
purposes.11 3 This information is recorded in an "automatic message account"
message record, which indicates the originating and terminating telephone numbers,
11 4
and the length of time for the call.
The inventive process involved adding a data field into the standard message
record to indicate whether a call involves a particular PIC (the "PIC indicator").115
The PIC indicator enabled interexchange carriers to provide differential billing for

100 Id. at 295.
Id.

101

102
103
104

958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294.
Id.

105 172 F.3d at 1359.
106

Id. at 1353.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109 Id.
110

AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1354.

111 Id.
112 Id.

113

Id.

Id,
11H5
AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1354.
114
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calls on the basis of an identified PIC.116 Claim 1 of the patent recited two steps: (1)
generating a message record for an interexchange call between an originating
subscriber and a terminating subscriber; and (2) including, in said message record, a
primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function of
whether or not the interexchange carrier associated with said terminating subscriber
117
is a predetermined one of said interexchange carriers.
The issue was whether this claim recited a "process" as that term was used in
the patent statute. 118 The district court had concluded that the claim was an
unpatentable mathematical algorithm. 119 The Federal Circuit concluded that it was
120
not, and upheld the patentability of the claim.
The court began by distinguishing the Supreme Court's decisions in Flook and
121
Benson as "narrowly limited" to claiming mathematical algorithms in the abstract.
This was consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment in Diehr,which appeared to
narrowly interpret those earlier decisions. In reliance on the Federal Circuit's
decision in State Street Bank, the court concluded that because the algorithm in the
claim was applied in a useful way to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result
without preempting other uses of the mathematical principle, it was not invalid as an
122
unpatentable mathematical algorithm.
But the court went further. Excel had also argued, relying on the authority of
Diehr and Sehrader,that the method claims were not patentable because there was
no physical transformation or conversion of subject matter from one state into
another. Judge Plager, who had written the earlier decision in Sehrader, concluded
that the notion of physical transformation could be misunderstood. Pointing to the
Supreme Court's use of the signal "e.g." when referring parenthetically to a function
that the patent laws were designed to protect, he concluded that physical
transformation was not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a
mathematical algorithm could bring about a useful application. 123
According to the court, the transformation that occurred in the earlier
Arrhythmia decision merely "confirmed" that the process had been applied to produce
a number that had a specific meaning. 124
In other words, it was not the
transformation itself that rendered the claim statutory, but the fact that the result of
the claimed process was a useful number. 125 As discussed below, this blending of the
usefulness and transformation requirements is problematic in this author's opinion,
because it eliminates an important determinant of process patentability under
Supreme Court and prior Federal Circuit precedent. The court concluded that the
analysis in Sehrader was now "unhelpful" in light of the recent State Street Bank
analysis. 126
116 Id.

HW7 d.
118

Id.at 1355.

119
120

Id.
AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1361.
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Id.at 1356.
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Id. at 1358.
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Id.at 1358-59.

Id. at 1359.
125 AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1359.
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Id.at 1360.
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The AT&T Corp. case is the latest word from the Federal Circuit on the
requirements of patentability for process claims. The Federal Circuit stated that,
"our inquiry here focuses on whether the mathematical algorithm is applied in a
practical manner to produce a useful result."127
No longer is any physical
transformation required in a process claim, as long as this practical application
requirement has been met. It is likely that few business method claims will fail to
meet this practical application test. Therefore, the definition of "process" in the
patent statute imposes a very low hurdle under present case law.
Although the Federal Circuit's decision in Arrythmia seemed to endorse
processes that transform data if that data represented physical quantities, the
Supreme Court has not endorsed that view. Consequently, it is unclear whether
transformation of something representing physical matter, as opposed to
transformation of the matter itself, is sufficient to support patentability. In light of
the argument that computer instructions per se involve sufficient physical
transformation, however, the distinction may not be material.

C. The 'MentalSteps" Doetrine
There is a body of case law, known as the "mental steps" doctrine, which
supposedly precludes patentability for claims that recite purely mental steps. Early
decisions by the CCPA, including In re Heritage128 and In re Ahrams 129, stated that
purely mental acts were not the proper subject matter for protection under the patent
statute.
The invention in Abrams, which related to a method of petroleum
130
prospecting, recited steps such as "measuring," "determining," and "comparing."
The CCPA affirmed the rejection of these claims on the ground that they recited
"mental concepts which ... are not patentable."' 13 1
Later decisions by the CCPA severely curtailed this doctrine, leaving the
validity of the doctrine in doubt. In In re Musgrave,13 2 the inventor claimed a
method of establishing corrections in seismic exploration, including various steps
such as "generating signals" and "applying corrections."1 3 3 The PTO had rejected the
claims as being directed to nonstatutory mental steps and, after acknowledging the
case law "to be something of a morass," the court concluded that the claims were not
unpatentable. 134 The court pointed to the specification, which disclosed that the
invention could be practiced using a computer, and stated that "we cannot agree with
the board that these claims (all the steps of which can be carried out by the disclosed
apparatus) are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some or all the
steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because
1 35
it may be necessary for one performing the processes to think."
Id. at 1360.
150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945).
129 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
130 Id. at 168.
131 Id. at 168.
132 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
133 Id. at 883-82.
134 Id. at 890.
135 Id. at 893.
127
128
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The court described a very liberal standard for patentability, stating that, "[aill
that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory
'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful
arts."' 136 The court speculated that claims directed to steps involving subjective
judgment might be rendered indefinite, but that was a different question than
whether it was a statutory "process."13 7 The Musgrave holding was thrown into
doubt, however, when the Supreme Court issued its restrictive ruling in Benson,
138
finding that a method for converting numerals could not be patented as a process.
Benson itself has been severely curtailed, 13 9 however, leaving some doubt as to the
present state of the law.
In In re Prater,140 the CCPA appeared to limit the "mental steps" doctrine to
methods in which the process
required the use of the human mind - a so-called
"purely mental process." 14 1 According to the CCPA, as long as the specification
disclosed something more than pencil and paper, the doctrine would not be
142
applicable.
Finally, in In re Meyer1443 , a case decided after Benson and Prater,the CCPA
again pointed to a "mental process" that was unpatentable on the basis that it "has
not been applied to physical elements or process steps."14 4 This was despite the fact
that one of the claims at issue specifically recited an apparatus comprising various
means for carrying out the functions. 145 This erroneous application of the "mental
steps" doctrine to a claim that specifically recited apparatus reveals one of the
problems in treating process and apparatus claims interchangeably. Just as it makes
no sense to treat a specifically recited apparatus as a process, application of the
"mental steps" doctrine to a physical machine also makes no sense.
The rationale for interchangeable treatment of process and apparatus claims is
likely diminished in light of the Federal Circuit's later decision in Alappat,146 which
held that a similarly drafted claim recited a statutory machine. Nevertheless, as
explained previously, the Federal Circuit continues to look behind the drafting of the
claim for purposes of section 101. The Meyer court also relied in part on the so-called
"Freeman-Walter" test, 147 which was itself discarded in the later State Street Bank
decision. So the validity and scope of the mental steps doctrine is still in question.
Assuming there is any vitality left to the mental steps doctrine, various
business-related method claims might be rejected as non-statutory.
Examples
include methods of teaching or instruction; methods of memorization or learning; and
methods of speaking a new language.
Id.
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 893.
138 Benson, 409 U.S. 63.
139 See Diehr,450 U.S. at 188.
140 Prater,415 F.2d 1393.
136
137

'I

142
143
144
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Id. at 1402 n.22.

Id. at 1405.
688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Meyer, 688 F.2d at 796.
Id. at 793.

146 33 F.3d 1526.
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Meyer, 688 F.2d at 794.
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Another possible objection to claims reciting purely mental steps arises from the
Constitution. If enforced against an infringer, a patent on a purely mental method
could literally prevent somebody from thinking. The PTO solicitor argued in a
petition for rehearing in 1968 that such claims would run afoul of the First, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. 148 The CCPA declined to resolve that
question.
In short, the validity of the mental steps doctrine is in doubt, but aspects of
the doctrine could be resurrected by the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court in a future
case. As explained in more detail below, the doctrine would be obviated by requiring
that every process claim recite a transformation of matter in order to render it
patentable.

D. The 'PersonalSkills" Doctrine
Some have suggested that "personal skills" such as teaching, athletic
techniques, haircutting methods, and similar activities should not qualify as
inventions under the U.S. patent laws. Nevertheless, despite a proposal in Congress
to place limitations on such patents, 149 there is no such exception to patentability
150
under current U.S. law, and numerous patents have issued in this general area.
The Canadian Patent Office has interpreted its patent laws as precluding the
patentability of "subject matter that is a process or the product of a process, that
depends entirely on artistic or personal skills, such as: procedures for exercising,
teaching, cosmetological procedures, hair dressing, pedicure, flower arranging,
painting pictures or playing musical instruments."' 15 1 The same rules apply to "a
process of surgery or therapy." 15 2 The basis for excluding such processes is that they
are not considered to meet the definition of an invention under Canadian law. The
word "invention" as defined under Canadian law closely tracks the U.S. statutory
definition, but it includes the following specific exclusion: "An art must accomplish
some change in the character or condition of material objects. Any art which belongs
to the professional fields and which is a manual art or skill is not an art within the
153
meaning of Section 2 of the Patent Act."
One could argue that new methods of practicing medicine qualify as
"personal skills" that should be excluded from patentability. But Congress in 1996
responded to criticism that doctors were unfairly patenting surgical methods by
Prater,415 F.2d at 1400 n.20.
119
See H.R. 1332, 107th Cong.
150 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,257,248 (issued July 10, 2001) entitled "Both Hand Hair Cutting
Method"; U.S. Patent No. 4,022,227 (issued May 10, 1977) entitled "Method of Concealing Partial
Baldness"; U.S. Patent No. 5,992,027 (issued Nov. 30, 1999) entitled "Method of Determining the
Correct Size in Women's Sewing Patterns"; U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued Dec. 22, 1998) entitled
"Building Block Training Systems and Training Methods"; U.S. Patent No. 5,558,519 (issued Sept.
24, 1996) entitled "Method for Instruction of Golf and the Like"; and U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036
(issued Aug. 22, 1995) entitled "Method of Exercising a Cat."
151 See Examples of Non-Statutory Subject Matter, § 16.04, available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/chl6-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
148

152 Id.
153
See Definition of a Statutory Invention, Section § 16.02, available
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/chl6-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
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enacting a limited restriction on enforcement of such patents. 154 The fact that
Congress addressed this perceived evil by narrowly limiting enforcement of surgical
method patents rather than excluding such patents from patentability indicates that
Congress did not intend to exclude such patents from the patent laws. It also
evidences intent that Congress did not intend to enact a broader "personal skills"
exception to patentability. Numerous patents have issued for various methods of
treating medical conditions using both drugs and by manipulating the human
155
body.
There is presently no "personal skills" exception to patentability. To the
extent that courts in the future decide to exclude such patents from the scope of
patent protection, such exclusion could probably better be handled through an
affirmative delineation of the scope of the "useful arts" limitation rather than
creating another negative patentability doctrine. In other words, the term "useful
arts" would not extend to personal skills not used in a technological sense - whatever
"technological" means.

E Inventions Lacking Actual Utility
Section 101 of the patent statute requires that patents may only be granted
for "useful" processes. The Federal Circuit has interpreted this to require "practical"
utility.1 56 Some inventors nevertheless have persisted in filing patent applications for
inventions that are inoperative according to modern laws of physics, such as
57
perpetual motion machines.
Such inventions are treated as not useful in the statutory sense because they are
impossible to operate with any utility. Business method inventions falling into this
category might include inventions having no useful purpose, such as a method of
clogging a sink or a method of making a window dirty. Another example might be a
method of using a computer to generate random numbers, where no utility is
disclosed or evident for the method. Given the generally liberal requirement for
utility,1 5 8 however, it is unlikely that many business method patents would fail to
overcome such a hurdle.

154 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (proscribing enforcement of patent infringement
remedies against "medical practitioners" for certain "medical activities").
155 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,305,380 (issued Oct. 23, 2001) entitled "Method For Treatment
of Cancer and Infectious Disease"; U.S. Patent No. 5,732,717 (issued Mar. 31, 1998) entitled
"Method For Treating Substance Abuse Withdrawafl; U.S. Patent No. 6,212,433 (issued Apr. 3,
2001) entitled "Method For Treating Tumors Near the Surface of an Organ"; U.S. Patent No.
6,199,555 (issued Mar. 13, 2001) entitled "Cancer Treatment Method"; U.S. Patent No. 6,347,633
(issued Feb. 19, 2001) entitled "Treatment of Hepatitis C Using Hyperthermia."
156 See, e.g., State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
157 See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
158 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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F. Abstract Ideas & Pure MathematicalAlgorithms
As noted above, the Supreme Court has made it clear that patents may not
claim abstract ideas and mathematical algorithms per se. In light of its decision in
Diehr,which narrowly interpreted this exception to patentability, few if any business
methods would fall into this trap. But differentiating abstract ideas from nonabstract ideas can prove difficult. Nevertheless, claims that fail to recite some
minimal real-world application might be rejected on this basis.
It is, of course, impossible for a physical machine to be merely an abstract
idea. Given that the name of the game is the claim, a business method that is cast in
the form of an apparatus claim should never be rejected under this doctrine.

V. TOWARD A REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSFORMATION OF MATTER

As suggested above, the Federal Circuit's decision in AT&T Corp. eliminated
the requirement that a process claim contain any sort of transformation in order to
render the claim patentable.
Instead, that decision collapsed the usefulness
requirement of the statute with the physical transformation requirement contained
in Supreme Court precedent. To that extent, the AT&T Corp. decision is arguably
inconsistent with Diehr and the other cases set forth above, all of which provided a
definition of "process" that included a transformation requirement.
Apparently, then, any type of method - including a business method - that
produces a "useful" result but that involves no physical steps would be patentable.
Examples include the method of interviewing a job candidate discussed in section I
supra; methods of teaching that increase learning retention; methods of shopping
that result in a reduction in prices paid for goods. Nor is it analytically helpful to
characterize certain methods such as these as merely abstract ideas. Such a
characterization would merely shift the inquiry to defining what is meant by an
abstract idea.
Unless the "useful arts" limitation or one of the other doctrines outlined above is
used to further limit the scope of such methods, there is apparently no limit to such
claims. Surely this is not what the Supreme Court has endorsed.

A. Process Claims:Statutoryif They Recite Physical Transformationof Matter
A better solution is to require that a process claim recite some sort of
transformation of matter as part of the process. As explained above, the requirement
for physical transformation finds support in several Supreme Court cases. The
requirement for physical transformation thus arises directly from the statutory
definition of a process as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Requiring recitation of the transformation in the claim ensures that the claimed
invention cannot cover an abstract idea, since by definition something that exists in
tangible form - even at the microscopic level - cannot be an abstract idea. The
physical transformation requirement thus distinguishes abstract ideas, principles,
and laws of nature from patentable subject matter. It also accomplishes what the
mental steps doctrine intended to accomplish - preventing patents on purely mental

[2:030 2002] Business Method Patents: Are There Any Practical Limits?

concepts. A new method of thinking or speaking would involve no transformation of
physical subject matter, unless it also included a transformative step.
Requiring a physical transformation also eliminates the need for the
mathematical algorithm exception to patentability. If a method claim recites a
physical transformation step, the method cannot wholly preempt the use of the
algorithm.
Requiring a transformation of matter also ensures that the claimed invention
satisfies the "useful arts" aspect intended by the framers of the Constitution. As
explained previously, a transformation of matter requirement provides a reasonably
good proxy for separating the "useful arts" such as engineering and science from the
"fine arts" such as literature, history, and painting.
Admittedly, it is not perfect, since an artist painting on the canvas can be said to
"physically transform" the canvas. 159 But that problem can be dealt with by treating
the artist's transformation - assuming that it is recited in a method claim - as a
statutory process and rejecting the claim for lack of novelty or nonobviousness. In
other words, once the painting process has been invented, it is obvious to apply any
pattern or combination of paint to the canvas, rendering such methods unpatentable.
An artist who creates a truly new process for applying paint to canvas - for example,
by using a jet engine to blow the paint onto the canvas - would be entitled to a patent
on the new process.
As to the possible argument that a human brain undergoes a physical
transformation of matter when a new thought courses through the brain, the courts
can surely deal with that problem by requiring that the physical transformation be
artificially induced rather than naturally induced. For example, although a method
of thinking would not be patentable because there is no artificially induced
transformation of matter, a method of curing insomnia by hooking up a patient's
brain to electrodes would be patentable. A similar problem might arise from
"transformative" steps such as writing on a piece of paper.
The Canadian patent law contains a definition of "invention" that closely
tracks the U.S. requirement for utility in section 101 of the U.S. patent law. 160 The
Canadian Patent Act, however, states that, "An art must accomplish some change in
the character or condition of material objects." 16 1 The Act further defines "process"
as "a mode or method of operation by which a result or effect is produced by chemical
action, by the operation or application of some element or power of nature or of one
substance to another." This definition is surprisingly similar to the requirement
suggested in early U.S. Supreme Court cases that a process must contain some
physical transformation in order to render it patentable. In other words, not all
processes in the literal sense are patentable - only those involving some tangible
activity on physical entities would be patentable.
Nor would requiring a physical transformation have altered the outcome in
AT&T Corp. The process claim at issue required steps of generating a message
159 Another example of this sort of problem might be a method for running a new football
formation; the players could conceivably be said to "transform" the ball on the field by moving it,
kicking it, etc.
160 See
Definition
of
a
Statutory
Invention,
§
16.02,
available
at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/scmrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/chl6e.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
161Id.
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record and including in the message record an indicator having a particular value.
These steps recite changes inside a physical computer or switch. Changing a value in
a computer or switch alters the state of the computer or switch, which is sufficient to
meet the physical transformation requirement. The same result would obtain for
processes that cause other changes at microscopic levels.
To summarize, the Federal Circuit has required that in order to be
patentable, an invention must produce a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." For
process claims, that should be only one of two requirements, the second requirement
being the recitation of some sort of transformation of matter. As discussed above,
changes occurring inside a computer by definition involve such a physical
transformation. Requiring that such a change be reflected in the claim is a small
price to pay for certainty.

B. Apparatus Claims: PerSe Statutory
It seems anomalous that a physical machine, which is what an apparatus
claim covers, could be considered an abstract idea. Yet, as explained above, some
court decisions can be read as rejecting apparatus claims as nonstatutory on the
basis that they are attempting to cover an abstract idea.
The better solution is to hold apparatus claims to no more than the "useful,
concrete and tangible result" standard. If the apparatus as disclosed has a practical
application and recites some structure, no further inquiry is required.
This principle - that apparatus claims are per se statutory under section 101,
even if they constitute a computer programmed with a mathematical algorithm - is
consistent with the Federal Circuit's holding in Alappat. In that case, the en banc
Federal Circuit based its decision in part on the fact that the apparatus claim at
issue contained means plus function clauses corresponding to circuit elements that
were combined inside a machine. 162 This, in combination with the fact that the claim
preamble recited "a rasterizer" which was a machine having a particularly stated
function, was sufficient in the Court's opinion to render the claim statutory for
purposes of section 101.
Although a mathematical algorithm by itself may not be statutory because it
lacks any practical utility, the use of the mathematical algorithm in a computer
constitutes a per se practical application of that algorithm, assuming that it is useful
in the utilitarian sense of the word.
A method of adding two numbers and producing a sum would not be
statutory. Nor would operating the method in a computer, unless the patent
described a practical use for that algorithm. If the specification described, for
example, that the computer programmed with the algorithm was useful as a cash
register (i.e., for tabulating purchases by a customer), the minimum level of practical
utility would be met, and the claim to the apparatus programmed with the algorithm
would be statutory. Only if the computer programmed with the algorithm had no
disclosed or apparent useful purpose would the claim fail. But it would fail not
because of any "mathematical algorithm" exception - it would fail because it had no
disclosed practical utility.
162 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
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In short, claiming a computer programmed with an algorithm is not the same
as claiming the naked algorithm. In light of the fact that many modern businesses
use general-purpose computers to carry out algorithmic operations, some may argue
that this exalts form over substance. But the form makes a critical difference. The
patented apparatus leaves others free to practice the algorithm in their heads or on
paper; or to use some future apparatus that does not fall within the scope of the
claimed apparatus. They are not permitted to practice it in the claimed apparatus.
Nothing about a claim to the machine prevents others from discussing, researching,
or analyzing the algorithm. In any event, unlike copyright law, there is no "fair use"
defense in patent law.
The Federal Circuit in Alappat recognized that a general purpose computer
programmed with instructions creates a "new machine, because . .. [it] in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular
functions pursuant to instructions from program software." 163 As stated by the
Federal Circuit:
The instructions of the software program that carry out the algorithm
electrically change the general purpose computer by creating electrical
paths within the device. These electrical paths create a special purpose
164
machine for carrying out the particular algorithm.
Some may argue that permitting an applicant to essentially cover a
mathematical algorithm or other abstract process by limiting its use to a computer
would provide overly broad patent protection to patent owners. There are at least
three responses to this. First, as noted above, the public is free to use the algorithm
by itself, either on paper or in their heads, so the algorithm is not "preempted" in the
Benson sense. 165 Second, broad claims cut both ways, making it easier to show that
the claim is invalid. To the extent that the PTO or an accused infringer could show
that the same or a similar algorithm was in the prior art, it would seem a fairly
obvious step to implement that algorithm in a computer as claimed. Third, nothing
prevents the PTO from raising other objections to the claim, such as indefiniteness.
To the extent that the claim is indefinite because it does not distinctly point out the
subject matter intended to fall within the claims, the PTO can require a more
narrowly tailored claim. But if an inventor has discovered a mathematical algorithm
and has claimed it in combination with a physical computer, the algorithm cannot be
"abstract."

163 Id. at 1545; accord, Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1399-400 ("If a machine is programmed in a
certain new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine without that program; its
memory elements are differently arranged.")
164 WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see
also, Bernhart,417 F.2d at 1400 ("if a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way,
it is physically different from the machine without that program; its memory elements are
differently arranged. The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt
us to conclude that the machine has not been changed").
1 5 Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247 n.il.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In order to be patentable, a process must be both "useful" in the sense that it
produces a useful result, and it must recite some transformation of matter to produce
a different state or thing. It is possible to have a process that produces a useful and
"concrete" result - as the Federal Circuit has defined it in State Street Bank without requiring any transformation of matter. 166 It is also possible to have a
transformative process that is not useful (e.g., a method of increasing traffic
congestion by transmitting signals to automobiles, causing them to randomly slow
down).
Either one of these examples could be made statutory by adding the missing
requirement.
A useful method of conducting an interview could be made
transformative by adding to the claim a requirement that a computer program be
used to transform an employment document into a preclearance rejection/acceptance
letter. Similarly, the method of increasing traffic congestion could be rendered
statutory by disclosing in the specification that the invention is actually useful for
reducing traffic fatalities by forcing drivers to slow down.
Imposing a requirement for some physical manifestation of a transformation
separates abstract ideas from applied ideas. For example, a method of operating on
numbers according to steps that merely manipulate the numbers is unpatentable
because although the steps may transform numbers in a literal sense, there is no
physical manifestation of the transformation. Limiting the steps to execution in a
digital computer, however, represents a physical manifestation of the transformation,
because the execution of computer instructions changes the physical state of the
machine - i.e., it turns it into a different machine.
Finally, the requirement for a transformation of matter is consistent with the
"useful arts" limitation of the U.S. Constitution and the definition of "process" as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Future court decisions can delineate the
boundaries of what constitutes sufficient transformation to render a claim statutory.

166 One example is the method of conducting an interview set forth in Section I.
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